Monday, March 15, 2004
Democracy and "Appeasement"
Today's NYT has several op-eds claiming Spanish voters "appeased" Al-Qaida by tossing out the Popular Party, which joined Bush's distinctly unpopular war on Iraq. Voters were clearly angry that the government sought to pin the bombing on ETA, rather than admit the possibility that the war on Iraq had made Spain less safe. But pundits like David Brooks simplify this to a question of doing "what al-Qaida wants":
In other words, voting for the Socialists is "letting the terrorists win" (get ready for this argument ad infinitum in the Bush-Kerry contest). But does this really make sense?
There's a conundrum here that becomes clearer if we parse Brooks in symbols. Let TA = terrorist attack and P = a "tough" status quo policy, which is either maintained or rejected. Brooks advocates democratic publics always follow a simple rule:
Necessarily, If TA then keep P
And he characterizes the only other option as
Necessarily, If TA then reject P
which is what he claims Spanish voters did, and he calls that giving control to the terrorists. On the other hand, I see both as equally giving up to the terrorists---either way, there is one option a terrorist can ensure happens.* In that sense neither course is democratic (whatever their reputational virtues may be).
Of course, another alternative is for voters to take into account the rest of their preferences (e.g., keep P after TA if they like P anyway, dump P after TA if they didn't like it anyway, or if P was only intended to stop TA, and obviously failed). Those rules don't give the terrorists any control at all, are actually democratic, and moreover are what the Spanish actually *did*.
They also avoid a trap set by Brooks and others who rail against "appeasement". The status quo policy they insist on keeping is always a "get tough" policy involving military force. If P were instead a diplomatic strategy, you can be sure they would insist on switching to force after an attack. So the only policy they want to lock in---regardless of whether it has worked or is democratically accepted---happens to be the one they personally advocate to begin with. Convenient.
* Terorists might even attack a hardened opponent not to change its policy, but to mobilize supporters for a long conflict that only later wears down the opponent. In this case, they may be even prefer an unchanged policy.
But I do know that reversing course in the wake of a terrorist attack is inexcusable. I don't care what the policy is. You do not give terrorists the chance to think that their methods work.
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/03/16/opinion/16BROO.html
In other words, voting for the Socialists is "letting the terrorists win" (get ready for this argument ad infinitum in the Bush-Kerry contest). But does this really make sense?
There's a conundrum here that becomes clearer if we parse Brooks in symbols. Let TA = terrorist attack and P = a "tough" status quo policy, which is either maintained or rejected. Brooks advocates democratic publics always follow a simple rule:
Necessarily, If TA then keep P
And he characterizes the only other option as
Necessarily, If TA then reject P
which is what he claims Spanish voters did, and he calls that giving control to the terrorists. On the other hand, I see both as equally giving up to the terrorists---either way, there is one option a terrorist can ensure happens.* In that sense neither course is democratic (whatever their reputational virtues may be).
Of course, another alternative is for voters to take into account the rest of their preferences (e.g., keep P after TA if they like P anyway, dump P after TA if they didn't like it anyway, or if P was only intended to stop TA, and obviously failed). Those rules don't give the terrorists any control at all, are actually democratic, and moreover are what the Spanish actually *did*.
They also avoid a trap set by Brooks and others who rail against "appeasement". The status quo policy they insist on keeping is always a "get tough" policy involving military force. If P were instead a diplomatic strategy, you can be sure they would insist on switching to force after an attack. So the only policy they want to lock in---regardless of whether it has worked or is democratically accepted---happens to be the one they personally advocate to begin with. Convenient.
* Terorists might even attack a hardened opponent not to change its policy, but to mobilize supporters for a long conflict that only later wears down the opponent. In this case, they may be even prefer an unchanged policy.
