Sunday, October 31, 2004
What does Osama want?
A lot of ink has been wasted on the pointless question of who Osama bin Laden would like to see as the next American president. What we should be discussing instead is what Osama wants---what is the al Qaeda grand strategy, if one exists, and how can we avoid playing into it, or even throw a spanner in the works.
I've been pondering this today, and am worried that bin Laden may be a much better strategist than we have given him credit. Suppose that what Osama really wants is the following:
1. A theocratically governed Islamic world, loosely directed by a community of religious leaders, in which Osama or his lieutenants and allies play a key role. These countries may not be unified politically (it doesn't seem like Osama and his type care much about the Westphalia system of nation-states one way or the other). They do want to be isolated from the modern, Western world and way of life.
2. The ultimate expulsion of American and other non-Islamist forces from the Dar-al-Islam, and more than that: the ability of Islamic countries to deter American intervention, and thus avoid manipulation by America.
There are several barriers in the way of these goals. The biggest is the threat of America to intervene to protect secular regimes in oil producing states from overthrow by unfriendly factions. This was credibly demonstrated in 1991.
Another missing ingredient is domestic social unrest and revolutionary movements.
The final problem for al Qaeda and Osama, created by their own actions on 9/11, is that they can never assume overt power, or step into the daylight anywhere, unless they want to be bombed to kingdom come. So any political action they take needs to be indirect. They seek to create conditions favoring their preferred outcomes---but they can't take the final actions themselves.
I suspect al Qaeda's agenda is to do two things: react to events in such as way that erodes these barriers, and set traps for their enemies (the US and its secular allies) that will weaken them no matter how they react. al Qaeda knows it is weak militarily, facing the greatest military and economic power in history. They cannot plan every step, because the US can always change the rules. But perhaps they are working on a plan with three phases:
Phase I: Draw the US into open conflict. Post Gulf War, directly mobilizing revolutionary movements in Saudi was pointless, because the US would surely intervene and crush them if necessary. So it became essential to draw the US into a conflict that would weaken this commitment. This began with attacks on embassies in Africa, on the Cole, and finally the WTC and Pentagon.
Phase II: Fight a wearisome, costly, indeterminable guerilla war with the US on Islamic soil. The Iraq conflict serves the aim perfectly. The goal in Phase II is to convince America and American citizens that intervention in the Middle East is doomed, bound to be bloody, and worth avoiding at all costs. The model here is Southeast Asia, which after the Vietnam War the US wanted nothing to do with. For this Phase, the idea is to keep the conflict going as long as possible. They don't want us to give up on Iraq. They want us to exhaust our military over many years in Iraq, and decide that ultimately, such adventures are no worth it in the Islamic world.
Phase III: Years down the road, support, in the distant background, any theocratic revolutionary movements that spring up in the Islamic world. Overt al-Qaeda activity may be counterproductive, by drawing in the US (which will always want revenge for 9/11). Better to let other groups pursue these revolutions, then, once much of the Middle East is theocratic, take a backroom role in running the umma.
***
This speculation assumes that Osama is a rational, calculating revolutionary leader---maybe not as smart or organized as Lenin or Mao, but someone operating in that mode. In contrast, we have no Kennans in the US government trying to figure this out (or if there are, they have to keep it very quiet). Our foreign policy at best involves promises to kill the bad guys, and at worst is used as a club to beat up on domestic opponents of the administration while rewarding cronies. I don't know if this speculation is right, but it could be. We should get much more serious about the game we are playing with al Qaeda, in the same way we got serious about the Soviet Union in 1948.
An interesting (falsifiable) implications of my theory:
Al Qaeda may be done attacking the US on our soil. Much better at this point to attack the US in Iraq, where our military is, to keep our forces bogged down, and in the long run convince Americans that it is a mistake to fight wars in Muslim countries. Also better to attack allies of the US in their own countries, to discourage their participation, and further isolate the US (raising the perceived costs of intervention). The theory is consistent with the otherwise puzzling lack of any recent al Qaeda attacks in the US, despite attacks in Spain and other areas of the world.
***
More on this later. A last thought: if this essay is right in broad outlines, it reinforces the need to go directly after the Qaeda leadership. I think Kerry will do just that. Bush has shown surprisingly little interest in that, and instead seems to enjoy a symbiotic relationship with Osama. His advisors even called Osama's last video "a little gift". They want to exploit Osama to scare the American people. I think Osama wants exactly the same thing.
I've been pondering this today, and am worried that bin Laden may be a much better strategist than we have given him credit. Suppose that what Osama really wants is the following:
1. A theocratically governed Islamic world, loosely directed by a community of religious leaders, in which Osama or his lieutenants and allies play a key role. These countries may not be unified politically (it doesn't seem like Osama and his type care much about the Westphalia system of nation-states one way or the other). They do want to be isolated from the modern, Western world and way of life.
2. The ultimate expulsion of American and other non-Islamist forces from the Dar-al-Islam, and more than that: the ability of Islamic countries to deter American intervention, and thus avoid manipulation by America.
There are several barriers in the way of these goals. The biggest is the threat of America to intervene to protect secular regimes in oil producing states from overthrow by unfriendly factions. This was credibly demonstrated in 1991.
Another missing ingredient is domestic social unrest and revolutionary movements.
The final problem for al Qaeda and Osama, created by their own actions on 9/11, is that they can never assume overt power, or step into the daylight anywhere, unless they want to be bombed to kingdom come. So any political action they take needs to be indirect. They seek to create conditions favoring their preferred outcomes---but they can't take the final actions themselves.
I suspect al Qaeda's agenda is to do two things: react to events in such as way that erodes these barriers, and set traps for their enemies (the US and its secular allies) that will weaken them no matter how they react. al Qaeda knows it is weak militarily, facing the greatest military and economic power in history. They cannot plan every step, because the US can always change the rules. But perhaps they are working on a plan with three phases:
Phase I: Draw the US into open conflict. Post Gulf War, directly mobilizing revolutionary movements in Saudi was pointless, because the US would surely intervene and crush them if necessary. So it became essential to draw the US into a conflict that would weaken this commitment. This began with attacks on embassies in Africa, on the Cole, and finally the WTC and Pentagon.
Phase II: Fight a wearisome, costly, indeterminable guerilla war with the US on Islamic soil. The Iraq conflict serves the aim perfectly. The goal in Phase II is to convince America and American citizens that intervention in the Middle East is doomed, bound to be bloody, and worth avoiding at all costs. The model here is Southeast Asia, which after the Vietnam War the US wanted nothing to do with. For this Phase, the idea is to keep the conflict going as long as possible. They don't want us to give up on Iraq. They want us to exhaust our military over many years in Iraq, and decide that ultimately, such adventures are no worth it in the Islamic world.
Phase III: Years down the road, support, in the distant background, any theocratic revolutionary movements that spring up in the Islamic world. Overt al-Qaeda activity may be counterproductive, by drawing in the US (which will always want revenge for 9/11). Better to let other groups pursue these revolutions, then, once much of the Middle East is theocratic, take a backroom role in running the umma.
***
This speculation assumes that Osama is a rational, calculating revolutionary leader---maybe not as smart or organized as Lenin or Mao, but someone operating in that mode. In contrast, we have no Kennans in the US government trying to figure this out (or if there are, they have to keep it very quiet). Our foreign policy at best involves promises to kill the bad guys, and at worst is used as a club to beat up on domestic opponents of the administration while rewarding cronies. I don't know if this speculation is right, but it could be. We should get much more serious about the game we are playing with al Qaeda, in the same way we got serious about the Soviet Union in 1948.
An interesting (falsifiable) implications of my theory:
Al Qaeda may be done attacking the US on our soil. Much better at this point to attack the US in Iraq, where our military is, to keep our forces bogged down, and in the long run convince Americans that it is a mistake to fight wars in Muslim countries. Also better to attack allies of the US in their own countries, to discourage their participation, and further isolate the US (raising the perceived costs of intervention). The theory is consistent with the otherwise puzzling lack of any recent al Qaeda attacks in the US, despite attacks in Spain and other areas of the world.
***
More on this later. A last thought: if this essay is right in broad outlines, it reinforces the need to go directly after the Qaeda leadership. I think Kerry will do just that. Bush has shown surprisingly little interest in that, and instead seems to enjoy a symbiotic relationship with Osama. His advisors even called Osama's last video "a little gift". They want to exploit Osama to scare the American people. I think Osama wants exactly the same thing.
